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I. INTRODUCTION
During every period of prolonged peace certain central
lessons of war are often forgotten. In that context,
historians and analysts frequently redevelop these forgotten
lessons of international conflict, and formulate new
observations on the effectiveness of a nation's security
apparatus, and its ability to wage war as an instrument of
national policy.
In the late 1960 's the Vietnam War was enormously
controversial in the United States, creating profound
divisions and confusion in the national life. By 1970 a
majority of Americans opposed the Vietnam War, and as a
consequence, there was a general repudiation of the U.S.
Military as the bearers of an unwanted history. (Sonnenberg,
1985, p. 441) During this period of national trauma, a mood
of public indignation and frustration arose over the apparent
inability of the U.S. Department of Defense to achieve its
espoused goals, particularly with respect to its ability to
conduct strategic planning, in order to effectively organize,
train, and equip forces to wage war. It was out of this sense
of indignation and frustration that the concept of defense
reform received considerable public and private momentum.
For the purposes of this analysis. Defense Reform is
defined as the systematic attempt by the nation's political
and social leadership to identify deficiencies in the
organization, managerial and leadership procedures of the
Department of Defense in order to improve the way the United
States goes about planning, acquiring, and operating its armed
forces, with the ultimate goal of ensuring U.S. security.
This thesis will seek to lay the basis for an analysis of
Defense Reform since 1970 by identifying critical sources of
defense reform and attempting to assess the impact of the
effort to achieve Defense Reform on the Defense Department.
Three research questions will be addressed:
1. Who have been involved in Defense Reform and what are
their main ideas?
2. What are the major events that established the context
for defense reform in this period?
3. To what extent were the individuals concerned with
reform efforts during this period successful in
introducing change in the Department of Defense?
A. GOALS OF THE STUDY
The primary thrust of the thesis will be to identify a
history of defense reform. A secondary aspect of the study
will focus on the impact of reform efforts in changing defense
structure and policy.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Time and research constraints preclude a study of all
aspects of defense reform. It is entirely possible that
alternative sources exist, and not all of them can be
identified within the confines of source availability for a
study of this nature. Therefore, this study will not attempt
to determine the effectiveness of a type of reform effort.
Additionally, it will not address the consequences of reform
efforts, nor will it focus on specific issues of acquisition
or procurement reform.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter I
introduces and describes the format of the thesis. Chapter
II, entitled, "Sources of Defense Reform Since 1970," is
divided into two parts. Section A identifies several of the
principle architects and personalities that have been
affiliated with issues of defense reform and discusses their
main ideas and recommendations. Section B identifies some of
the key organizations, both public and private, and one public
commission, that have been proponents of defense reform and
briefly discusses their goals and constituencies. Chapter
III, entitled, "U.S. Military Operations Since 1970," provides
a summary of the principle U.S. military operations since
1970, which because of their inconclusive outcome, raised a
number of controversial defense issues to the public agenda
and subsequently influenced the process of defense reform.
Chapter IV, entitled, "Descriptive Overview of Reform
Efforts," provides a chronology of the actions of the key
persons identified in Chapter II and the sequence of events
that took place in the context of reform in order to establish
a cause and effect relationship between the reformers' actions
and subsequent changes that were implemented within the
Defense Department. Chapter V provides an analysis of the
defense reform efforts that took place during the period
covered and attempts to assess the impact of these efforts.
Chapter VI, entitled, "Conclusion and Recommendations,"
provides a summary and recapitulation of the thesis and
concluding analysis, to include a recommendation on the
benefit of an increased understanding of the process of
defense reform.
D. METHODOLOGY
An historical methodology will be employed using primary
and secondary sources to seek answers to the three research
questions identified above. A primary source is defined as a
work that was written at a time that is contemporary with the
subject, and a secondary source is defined as a work that
discusses the subject but was recorded after the time
contemporary with it.
The historical method involves obtaining information about
a period and then making judgments about the significance,
meaning, and relevance of that information. The method is not
necessarily scientific and thus may be subject to biases and
inaccuracies.
E. DATA COLLECTION
Active data collection for this study began in the spring
of 1989 and terminated in the fall of 1989. The data
collection consisted of a literature search for resource
material and in-depth interviews with several of the key
players.
Resource material consisted of official documents from the
executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government,
think tank reports, magazine and newspaper articles, and
editorials, and articles and position papers written by
various public policy entrepreneurs.
Four interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. during
the week of 25 to 29 September 1989. Each of these interviews
are cited in the list of references. The interviews were used
to gather factual and background information on each of the
interviewees, and they were ask to describe major life
accomplishments and provide perspectives on issues of defense
reform. All of the interviewees were from positions outside
of government at the time of the interview, although each had
previously been employed in some capacity by the government.
II. SOURCES OF DEFENSE REFORM SINCE 1970
Defense Reform has its origins with many sources, but for
the purposes of the period covered since 1970, appears to have
been concentrated around a small group of legislators,
writers, military officers, and civilian analysts in the
Washington, D.C. area. Although reform was not limited to
this geographic locale, it appears that the nation's capitol,
as the focus of legislative and executive authority, provided
center stage for a receptive audience both in the government
and with the public at large.
Whether or not the concept of Defense Reform can be
defined as a movement in the sense of an emerging grass roots
organization with specific goals, or whether it was simply a
loose confederation of individuals with some common ideas and
desires is a matter of ongoing debate (Interview Canby, 1989)
.
However a number of key players^ and organizations have
^Author's Note: In describing the key players in this
study the following terms are defined: Public
Entrepreneurship, the process of introducing innovation, the
generation and implementation of new ideas, in the public
sector; Policy Intellectual, the originator of an innovative
idea; Policy Entrepreneur, a person outside the formal
positions of government, who introduces and facilitates the
implementation of new ideas in the public sector; Bureaucratic
Entrepreneur, a person who occupies nonleadership positions in
government and introduces and implements new ideas from his
particular vantage point in public organizations; Executive
entrepreneur, a person who from his leadership position in
governmental agencies and departments, generates and
implements new ideas; Political Entrepreneur, a person who
received considerable public recognition in this area and are
discussed in the following two parts of this chapter.
A. KEY PLAYERS
1. William S. Lind
Age 42, A.B. Dartmouth, M.A. Princeton 197 3, from 197 3
to 1976, Lind served as Legislative Assistant to Senator
Robert Taft, Jr.
,
Republican of Ohio. During that time, he
helped to write the White Paper on Defense, "A Modern Military
Strategy of the United States." (Taft, 1978)
From 1977 to 1986 he served as Legislative Assistant
for Armed Services to former Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of
Colorado. Since 1987 Lind has been affiliated with the Free
Congress Foundation, Center for Cultural Conservatism from
where he has continued to write for a number of military and
professional journals as an advocate of defense reform.
(Interview Lind, 1989)
It was in 1976/1977 that Lind first began to receive
considerable prominence in defense reform circles when he
publicly challenged Army doctrine then being developed by
General William DePuy (TRADOC) and his Deputy Brigadier
General William Dyke. The Army at that time was engaged in
revising many aspects of its doctrine. In the process of
introduces and implements new ideas as a holder of elective
office. (Roberts and King, 1989, pp. 2, 13)
rewriting Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1976 edition) the
generals had briefed selected members of congress and the
public that their updated version represented an improved
doctrine based on "fighting outnumbered and winning" and
"winning the first battle." (Interview Canby, 1989) Lind, in
an article published in Military Review , in March 1977,
publicly refuted their version of doctrinal progress from the
perspective of his own knowledge of military history, maneuver
warfare and tactics. (Lind, 1977, pp. 55-65) From this
debate considerable public discussion ensued, particularly in
congressional circles. (Interview Canby, 1989)
In 1980 Lind provided considerable input to a widely
received editorial opinion published by Senator Hart in The
Wall Street Journal on Friday, 2 3 January 1981, entitled "The
Case for Military Reform." (Hart, 1981) Together, Mr. Lind
and Senator Hart then co-authored and published the best
selling book on defense reform, America Can Win , in 1986.
(Hart, 1986)
The essential thrust of Lind's theories have dealt
with the U.S. Military's concept of land warfare. Lind
rejects what he feels has been our past concept of conducting
wars of attrition dominated by massive firepower. Instead he
advocates the adoption of a concept the Germans demonstrated
in World War II. This concept of land warfare is based on
maneuver and is more effective he argues, especially for the
side with fewer men and less equipment. He states for
example:
We have generally depended on our tremendous manpower and
material to overwhelm forces that were better, unit by unit.
We gin up the production lines and crush the enemy with
steel safes. That is no longer the circumstance—we are the
smaller force—and our doctrine and training must change to
reflect it. (Fallows, 1979, p. 63)
Lind, along with his political mentor, former Senator
Hart, has consistently advocated a reexamination of our
concept of land warfare, emphasizing that it is
counterproductive to merely spend more money to buy more
hardware. (Hart, 1981)
Over the past few years Lind has published a number of
articles in the Marine Corps Gazette . He has developed a
sympathetic following within the Marine Corps, and it is not
surprising that he is favorably disposed toward the Marines.
He has a significant influence within the Marine Corps and
access to some of its senior leadership. (Saxman, 1989, p.
58)
2 . Colonel John R. Boyd USAF (Ret.)
Colonel Boyd was a renowned fighter pilot and
instructor during his active duty days in the U.S. Air Force.
As a Captain he developed tactics that are still a basis of
the U.S. Air Forces' approach to air to air combat. (Hart,
1986, p. 5) An early proponent of defense reform, he has been
periodically employed since his retirement as a Defense
Consultant at the Pentagon, and currently resides in Florida.
(Fallows, 1979, p. 62)
Colonel Boyd received considerable prominence for the
development in February 1979 of an unpublished briefing
entitled "Patterns of Conflict," in which he formulates his
Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) theory.^
This theory, which is studded with historical references from
the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. to Clausewitz, the
Blitzkrieg, and the Vietnam War, is the product of three years
of Boyd's starting-from-scratch self-education in the nature
of combat. (Fallows, 1979, p. 62) Boyd's theory contends
that the outcome of combat is determined not by the bigger
cannon, or even by the larger force, but by the shrewdest
combination of equipment, training, and ideas toward the end
of adaptability. He bases his theory on his reflections of
the air combat records of the Korean War, when the
maneuverability of U.S. Jets appeared to count more than the
technological superiority of the Soviet-manufactured North
Korean Jets. The essential element of his theory is that all
levels of conflict, from the boxer in the ring, to the general
in the tent, consist of endless cycles of Observation,
Orientation, Decision, Action. Whoever goes through these
^The brief, "Patterns of Conflict," was updated and
reprinted by Colonel Boyd in August 1987 under the new title
"A Discourse on Winning and Losing." For continuity, the
first title of the brief is used throughout this thesis.
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cycles the more quickly will prevail, because his adversary's
actions will become "more and more irrelevant, since they are
responding to actions you have already changed." (Fallows,
1979, p. 62) In every case the critical competition is in
time.
The element of confusion and sheer human weakness also
figures prominently in this scheme. Boyd cites countless
reports from World Wars I and II and quotes the ancient
Chinese military Theorist Sun Tzu. Boyd's approach also
dictates strategy and tactics—a strategy of striking at the
head rather than hacking away at the limbs, and tactics of
giving each low level unit maximum freedom to adapt and
exploit the opportunities that open up as the battle
progresses. (Boyd, 1979)
3 . Dr. Stephen L. Canby
Age 56, B.S. USMA, West Point (1956), Ph.D. Political
Economy and Government, Harvard University, a veteran of six
years of active duty service as an Army infantry officer. Dr.
Canby is currently a Washington, D.C. -based defense consultant
with C&L Associates. He is also an adjunct professor with the
National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.
(Interview Canby, 1989)
During his active duty Army service. Dr. Canby served
tours in the Federal Republic of Germany and at the Ranger
School, Fort Benning, Georgia. As a young Captain, Canby was
tasked with writing a manual on small-unit infantry tactics.
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He attempted to write a new manual to reflect actual combat
experiences. Upon initial circulation at the Army's Infantry
School the new manual was received with mixed reviews from
established departments with entrenched interests. (Hart,
1986, p. 7)
After leaving the Army, Dr. Canby received his
doctorate from Harvard and went to work for the RAND
Corporation and later for Technology Service Corporation. In
both instances he was employed as a defense analyst. In the
1970's, he moved to Washington, D.C. and established himself
as an independent Defense Consultant. (Hart, 1986, p. 7) He
has authored numerous studies on military strategy and
tactics, military organization, and defense manpower.
(Barlow, 1981, p. 43)
Dr. Canby feels that the need for defense reform in
the U.S. goes back as far as World War II. He states that
U.S. Army performance in land warfare was not effective both
on the continent and in the Philippines, but because we won
the war it was difficult to criticize those institutions that
achieved success at that time. However events since World War
II have clearly established a need for reform in Canby 's view.
He cites the Korean War, Vietnam Conflict, Mayaguez Incident,
Desert One, Grenada, and the Beirut Bombing of U.S. Marines,
as all being instances that highlight the need for reform
within the U.S. defense establishment. It was a trip to
Israel with Dr. Edward Luttwak that particularly highlighted
12
the need for defense reform in the U.S. Military in Canby's
mind. During this trip Drs. Canby and Luttwak were met and
briefed by the Israeli Defense Forces' Brigadier General Ben-
Gal of the 7th Brigade in the Golan Heights. Brigadier
General Ben-Gal effectively demonstrated for his visitors the
use of barriers as a "rationing device" in linear warfare. It
was a concept Canby feels the U.S. Army has missed entirely.
(Interview Canby, 1989)
Among the more widely received of Dr Canby's
publications is his article "Military Reform and the Art of
War" published in the Fall 1982 issue of International
Security Review . Canby's essential theory of defense reform,
as espoused in this article is that defense spending alone is
not a good measure of military prowess and capability. It is
merely a measure of input and the burden upon society. He
defines "Military Superiority" as a condition of strategic
parity and conventional superiority. (Canby, 1982, p. 246)
He argues that in the nuclear age, unless one side obtains a
dramatic strategic advantage, the only usable forces are
conventional, and that is where improvements should be
concentrated. Whatever western military inferiority exists,
Canby feels is due, not to inadequate resources, but to a lack
of combat forces, and to a tactical and operational passivity
stemming from a doctrine emphasizing positional defense of
linear lines and firepower. The solution he espouses is
structural realignment, stating that U.S. and western military
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inferiority, if it exists, is purely self-inflicted. Canby is
a firm advocate for updating doctrine to increase the ratio
of combat units, and he argues for the improved use of
technology and manpower, and an enhanced strategy and closer
integration with allies. (Canby, 1982, pp. 245-268)
4 . Dr. Edward N. Luttwak
Dr. Luttwak first arrived in the U.S. in 1972.
Describing himself as an Armenian born in 1942, he and his
family left their ancestral home in Transylvania, in what is
now Rumania, at the end of World War II. He spent most of his
adolescence attending Jesuit schools in Palermo, Italy, and
received further education in England (London School of
Economics), Israel, and in the United States (Ph.D. Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland under the noted
academician Dr Robert Stacker)
.
Dr. Luttwak 's military experience is limited to Royal
Army Reserve training he participated in while a student in
England. He has also been a frequent observer of military
activities in Israel. (Interview Luttwak, 1989)
As of this writing Dr. Luttwak is holder of the
distinguished Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at the
Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D.C. He has served as a consultant to the National Security
Council, Department of Defense and Department of State. He
has also performed contractual work for the U.S. Army and
foreign armies on tactical and operational matters,
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independently, and in conjunction with his partner Canby of
C&L Associates. He has lectured at universities in the U.S.
and abroad, as well at the National Defense University, the
War Colleges, and other U.S. and foreign military schools. An
accomplished and prolific writer, he is the author of eight
books, including Strategy; The Logic of War and Peace . On the
Meaning of Victory and The Pentagon and The Act of War .
Additionally he has published numerous essays, articles and
editorials for periodicals and journals in the U.S. and
abroad.
With respect to defense reform in the U.S. Dr. Luttwak
feels that:
We have an outmoded military establishment, which failed in
Vietnam, Iran, and Lebanon, and continues to fail silently
in providing adequate military readiness, .. .and is in need
of drastic fundamental reform. (Luttwak, 1984, title page)
In his writings he attempts to demonstrate that no matter how
great our defense expenditures, we can rebuild America's
military effectiveness only through systematic change and a
unified strategy. He sees the source of the Pentagon's ills
as caused by the presence of "too many officers, a materialist
bias, and mismanagement of personnel, etc." Overall there is
the failure to have developed a coherent national military
strategy. A solution that he offers is the creation of a
general staff or "national defense officers" divorced from
separate service loyalties. (Luttwak, 1984, p. 272)
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Dr. Luttwak differs from many of his fellow advocates
of defense reform in that he is acutely aware of "how real
reform depends on insiders who are both real reformers and
real insiders." He feels strongly that when an outside
reformer is given the opportunity for acceptance by the
establishment, he should move into the fold and subsequently
support the establishment from within in order to effectively
implement his ideas. (Interview Luttwak, 1989)
Not without his critics, however. Dr. Luttwak was
initially closely affiliated with Lind and some other
prominent defense reformers, but their relationships soured
when it was alleged by some that Luttwak 's views were tainted
by his supposed acceptance of remuneration from the Northrup
Corporation for his advocacy of the development of the F/A-18
Aircraft as a needed technology reform. (Interview Lind,
1989) Additionally, by his own admission, Luttwak feels that
his consulting contracts with the Department of Defense have
been severely curtailed because of the personal intervention
of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger over
allegations of Dr Luttwak 's competence. (Interview Luttwak,
1989) Neither of these allegations can be substantiated by
this researcher.
5 . Michael R. Burns
Currently a 38 year-old Senior Fellow with Business
Executives for National Security (BENS) , Inc. of Washington,
D.C., Mr. Burn's affiliation with defense reform has been more
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in the position of expeditor and observer, rather than as
writer and theorist. A graduate of lona College and Long
Island University (M.A. Political Philosophy) , Mr. Burns has
been closely affiliated with a number of the more prominent
elected and appointed personalities associated with defense
reform since the mid 1970 's. In particular he has been a keen
behind the scenes observer of the inner workings of the
Congressional Defense Reform Caucus (to be discussed later in
this chapter) and related groupings and official organizations
affiliated with defense reform in the Washington, D.C. area.
Burns' work experience includes employment with the
Heritage Foundation from 1979-81, work as a Congressional
Fellow in National Security Affairs, Legislative Assistant to
Representative Newt Gingrich (Republican, Georgia) , and
Special Assistant to Mr. Ray Raehn of the U.S. Global Strategy
Counsel of Washington, D.C.
His personal background does not include active or
reserve military service, and he has been employed with BENS
Inc. for the past six years.
It is from his unique vantage point as a somewhat
detached observer that Burns is able to offer a number of
elucidating insights on the subject of defense reform since
1970. An example of this is seen in his citation of an oft-
quoted comment of General Lynch, U.S. Army (Retired) who would
frequently ask congressmen and their staffers to explain "What
is the incentive a guy has to advance on an enemy sniper?"
17
The answer to this hypothetical question, in Burns' view, was
not readily amenable to a neat tweak in the Congressional
Defense Budget, and caused many congressmen and staffers to
become concerned with the notions of incentives and
disincentives with respect to directed behavior. He therefore
acknowledges a growing congressional recognition in the late
1970 's and early 1980 's of the necessity for a moral dimension
to be added to defense thinking that had been woefully
insufficient up until that time.
Mr. Burns feels that as we as a nation have moved
further and further away from the agony of Vietnam, our
"corporate denial of the existence of this dilemma" will pass
and more effective self-examination of our government
processes will be possible. (Interview Burns, 1989)
6 . James Fallows
A former speech writer for President Jimmy Carter,
James Fallows is currently Washington Editor for the Atlantic
Monthly . He has extensive overseas journalistic experience,
primarily in Asia, and has undoubtedly done the most to
popularize the ideas of defense reform. He is the author of
several highly acclaimed books including National Defense
(1981) and More Like Us (1989) . However, it was a series of
articles that he wrote for the Atlantic Monthly in 1979 and
1981 that projected him into the arena of defense reform.
The first article, "Muscle-Bound Super Power, the
State of America's Defense," published in October 1979,
18
highlighted concerns that the nation's military security was
inadequate and emphasized a fear that the United States'
military had become shackled to high technology that might
fail when put to the ultimate test of combat. The article
emphasized the crucial public debate then underway, about not
only how much to spend on national defense, but how better to
spend it. (Fallows, 1979, p. 59)
The second article, entitled "The Civilianization of
the Army," published in April 1981, dealt with ongoing
concerns about the effectiveness of the all-volunteer force in
view of the then current quality of the incoming volunteers,
and the institutional changes that had been implemented to
recruit and retrain the all-volunteer force. Although written
before the recruiting/retention successes of the mid-1980 's,
the article alleged that conditions of service in the
contemporary all-volunteer force undermined the unique
qualities a fighting force must posses. As a solution to this
dilemma Mr. Fallows advocates a return to the draft, albeit in
this case a reformed draft that does not suffer the unjust
inequities of the Vietnam-era conscription. (Fallows, 1981,
pp. 98-108)
Although not necessarily a policy intellectual, but
more a conveyer of other theorist's ideas. Fallows has been
portrayed as a key personality in advocating concepts of
defense reform.
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7 . Harry G. Summers Jr.
A retired U.S. Army Colonel with a distinguished
career as an infantryman and designated Army Strategist,
Colonel Summers holds bachelor's and master's degrees in
military arts and science. His active duty career included an
instructor tour on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College as
holder of the General Douglas MacArthur Chair in strategy, and
an instructor tour at the Army's Command and Staff College.
He was a member of General Creighten Abram's strategic
assessment group and served in the office of the Army Chief of
Staff from 1975 to 1979. (Summers, 1981, p. 122)
Summers is currently a contributing editor for U.S.
News and World Report (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, p. IV), and his
articles on strategy have appeared in a number of periodicals
including Military Review and Naval Institute Proceedincfs .
(Summers, 1981, p. 122) It is, however, his publication On
Strategy, The Vietnam War in Context that has received the
most critical acclaim and review with respect to issues of
defense reform. (Interviews Lind and Canby, 1989)
The focus of Colonel Summers' theory has been to seek
a balance in the critical issues facing the post-Vietnam Army.
He readily acknowledges criticism of the Army for over-
reliance on attrition and its failure to appreciate the
benefits of maneuver when dealing with principles of land
warfare. He feels such criticisms serve a useful function to
the degree that they cause the Army to examine its
20
organization and doctrine. But he argues further that since
criticisms are frequently one-sided and argumentive, they
often oversimplify and confuse the issue. He alludes to the
problem of reform as not a simple one of "either/or" but a
much more complicated one of "both/and." The true problem he
feels is the need to maintain a proper balance between such
competing demands as leadership and management, attrition and
maneuver. He also acknowledges a compounding concern for what
he calls the "unfortunate" constitutional requirement to
justify military needs to the congress in monetary terms which
frequently causes the complexity of balance to be overlooked.
Colonel Summers further challenges civilian leadership
to be aware of the imperatives of military operations. He
feels they need to understand that national policy affects not
only selection of the military objective, but also the very
way that war is conducted. (Summers, 1982, pp. 1-4, 111-121)
8 . Pierre M. Sprey
An engineering graduate of Yale University and Cornell
University, Pierre Sprey has an extensive background in
analytical studies dealing with such subjects as tactical air
effectiveness and NATO force structure. He worked as a
Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
from 1966 to 1970, and was formerly a research scientist with
Grummen Aircraft Corporation and later a Vice President of
Enviro Control Inc. Since 1977 he has been the president of
his own defense consulting firm, Pierre M. Sprey Inc.
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Although most of his writing has been done under contract, his
expertise, particularly in the matters of tactical aircraft
design and employment of such aircraft as the A-10, is well
known throughout the defense community. His link to military
reform has been in his advocacy of hardware effectiveness and
in his articulation of the need for improvements in the
weapons acquisition system, particularly in the areas of
competitive procurement, operational testing and competitive
prototyping. (Barlow, 1981, p. 44)
9 . Charles C. Moskos
A distinguished American military sociologist, Charles
C. Moskos ia a veteran of enlisted U.S. Army service during
World War II and is currently a professor at Northwestern
University in Chicago. His expertise in military sociology
rests on a broad base of more than 20 years of research and
writing. (Thomas, 1989, p. 79)
The key element of Moskos' contribution to defense
reform is the institution-to-occupation (I/O) model that he
first developed in 1977. Simply put, this model sees the
motivation of military personnel as falling between two
opposing poles: loyalty to the military institution itself
("the calling") and loyalty to the occupation ("the job").
Moskos originally advanced this model in opposition to what he
saw as the domination of defense planning by economic analysts
and their purely material considerations that had led to the
establishment of the all-volunteer force. He submits that a
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failure to recognize the distinction between the institutional
and organizational requirements of the military has led to
inherent defects in the all-volunteer force. Moskos has
perceived that soldiers are in the all-volunteer force just
to have a job. Lacking traditional loyalty to their calling,
these soldiers are deficient in morale, discipline and unit
cohesion. (Moskos, 1989, pp. 3-14)
Moskos advocates a requirement for national service
based on an emotional preference for a socially-representative
military in addition to the common desire for more effective
recruiting of better qualified personnel. He advances the
sentimental argument of militia versus regular army that dates
from the days of the Continental Army. Moskos is convinced
that the health of a democratic society demands that military
service be a recognized civic duty frequently performed and
that its military be representative of all levels of that
society. Thus the all-volunteer force, whatever its quality,
will continue to be fundamentally flawed in his view.
(Thomas, 1989, p. 80)
10. David Packard
A graduate of Stanford University's engineering
program, David Packard, together with his associate William
Hewlett, founded the spectacularly successful Hewlett-Packard
Company in 1938. The company is the world's leading
manufacturer of electronic test and measurement equipment, and
Mr. Packard is the chairman of the board. His familiarity
23
with the problems of defense management and his keen interest
in defense reform derives from his business career and his
service as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971.
(Packard, 1987, p. vi) His rise to prominence with respect to
defense reform came with his appointment by President Reagan
to the chairmanship of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense Management from 1985 to 1986. The final report to
President Reagan was a document entitled A Quest for
Excellence . This report contains an analysis and a series of
recommendations designed to improve defense management, and
many of the recommendations have since been implemented in one
form or another.
The recommendations themselves are divi'ded into four
major areas: national security planning and budgeting,
military organization and command, acquisition organization
and procedures, and government-industry accountability. They
can be briefly summarized as a call for streamlining the
defense bureaucracy and upgrading the acquisition work force,
in addition to a selected list of other measures.
(President's Commission, 1986)
11. Edward R. Jayne
An Air Force Academy graduate and a holder of a
doctorate in political science and national security policy
from MIT, Jayne was selected as a White House Fellow following
his first Vietnam combat tour as an A-1 Skyraider pilot. As
the recipient of two silver stars and five Distinguished
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Flying Crosses, he was assigned to the Executive office of the
President (Nixon at the time) where he worked as a special
assistant to the director of the Council on International
Policy. After this assignment he was reassigned to a second
tour in Southeast Asia, this time flying F-4 fighter bombers
out of Thailand. Upon his return to Washington, still in
uniform, he joined the National Security Council Staff as a
specialist on defense policy and programs. Zbigniew Brezinski
arranged for him to stay on through the Carter Administration.
President Carter, impressed with his qualifications at age 32,
invited him to resign his Air Force commission as a major and
accept appointment as associate director of the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) , which Jayne accepted. (Canan,
1982, pp. 34-35)
While Jayne was in this position he spoke out and
worked forcefully for a more closely supervised defense budget
that attempted to force the services to winnow their annual
wish lists, and do a better job of rationalizing their
technologies and form-fitting their forces. Jayne was
persuaded that the military suffered more from incoherence of
forces and weapons than it did from an aggregate shortage of
spending money. He used the budget to "ride heard" on the DOD
to include their planning and policy making efforts as
measures of their effectiveness. (Canan, 1982, p. 34)
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Jayne left the Office of Management and Budget in mid-
1980 to become Director of Aerospace Planning, a newly created
post, at General Dynamics Corporation. (Canan, 1982, p. 76)
B. ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMISSION
1 . Congressional Military Reform Caucus
Founded and organized in the summer of 1981 by Senator
Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, and Representative G. William
Whitehurst, Republican of Virginia, the Defense Reform Caucus
is a bi-partisan group of representatives and senators loosely
united by a vaguely defined goal of achieving some measure of
defense reform. (Interview Lind, 1989)
The caucus initially prided itself on having no
leaders or staff and attempted to achieve its goals by forging
consensus. Basically the members would like those in charge
of the nation's defense to plan ahead, starting with congress
and ending with the lowest rifle platoon. Once that is done
they would like tactics and weapons to fit the plan. The plan
in their view, is more important than sophisticated, gold-
plated weapons. The original caucus membership consisted of
about 54 Representatives and Senators and their 1982
membership is appended as Appendix A. (Marsh, 1982, pp. 55-
56)
In the current 101st Congress, the caucus stands at
about 13 members, and it is formally co-chaired by Senator
William V. Roth Jr., Republican of Delaware, and
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Representative Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California.
(Morrison, 1989, p. 46)
2
.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Founded in 1982, CSIS is an independent, tax exempt,
public policy research institution, based in Washington, D.C.
Its stated mission is to advance the understanding of emerging
world issues in the areas of international security,
economics, politics, and governance. It does no classified or
proprietary work and its reports are available to the public.
Within its functional programs of Arms Control, National
Security and Political-Military Affairs, it has been closely
affiliated with issues of defense reform. It is funded by
private sector contributions and through corporate and
government research projects. (Brochure, CSIS, 1989)
3 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Inc.
A commercial trade association founded in 1982 by
Stanley A. Weiss, an American Businessman, BENS Inc. seeks to
apply successful business practices to what they describe as
"the challenge of building a strong, effective, affordable
defense." Its membership consists primarily of business
executives and entrepreneurs, who work to bring the lessons
of the corporate world to the management of national security.
It has established a reputation as a conservative grass roots
network of about 5000 businessmen with interests in the





A Washington-based, tax-exempt, non-partisan policy
research institution, The Heritage Foundation publishes a wide
variety of research in various formats for the benefit of
decision-makers and the interested public. An avowedly
conservative foundation, its principle source of support is
through the receipt of tax-deductible gifts from individuals,
corporations and associations. The foundation's primary forum
for the dissemination of ideas is through the publication of
a series of policy studies. These publications are in-depth
analyses of major issues written by scholars or experienced
professionals in the appropriate field. Since the late 1970 's
the foundation has published a number of policy studies
related to issues of defense reform. They also publish a
quarterly journal of public policy and sponsor a Washington
Semester Program for interested undergraduate and graduate
students to increase their knowledge of Congress and the
legislative process through first-hand experience with





The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management was an ad hoc group of retired senior military
officers, former defense officials, and business executives,
that was appointed by President Reagan in 198 5 to study the
U.S. Defense Establishment and formulate recommendations for
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its improvement in light of recent concerns dealing with the
military's recent performance in Lebanon and Grenada. As
discussed in Section A, the industrialist David Packard was
named to the Chairmanship of the Commission.
The findings and recommendations of the Commission
(The Packard Commission) were contained in a report entitled
"A Quest For Excellence." This report was a comprehensive
call for defense structural reorganization and it provided
specific recommendations to address coordination and
procurement deficiencies. The recommendations are summarized
in four areas as follows.
a. National Security Planning and Budgeting
The report calls for a rational system whereby the
Executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring
agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry
it out, and the funding that should be provided— in light of
the overall economy and competing claims on national
resources. (Commission Summary, 1986, p. xvii)
b. Military Organization and Command
The commission made two recommendations. The
first was to improve the command of deployed U.S. military
forces under the unified commanders, including both the
established worldwide commands, and those assigned for
specific actions. Second, the commission recommended that the
chairman of the JCS and the unified commanders should be given
a stronger role in the process of deciding what new weapons
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should be acquired and in distributing the resources available
among the military departments. (Commission Summary, 1986, p.
XX)
c. Acquisition Organization and Procedures
The commission recommended that improvements be
made in the process by which the Department of Defense and
Congress buy military equipment and material in three ways.
One, by creating the new position of an undersecretary of
defense for acquisition (a procurement czar) . Two, by making
better use of technology to reduce cost and improve
perfomnance . Three, by restructuring a joint Requirements and
Management Board co-chaired by the acquisition czar and a
newly created vice chairman of the JCS. (Commission Summary,
1986, pp. xxi-xxvii)
d. Government-Industry Accountability
The commission recommended that civil and criminal
enforcement of defense procurement activities be made more
effective by improving current standards of conduct for
personnel concerned and by increasing clear and coordinated
oversight of contractor performance without impeding their
efforts at sel f-improvement . (Commission Summary, 1986, p.
xxvii)
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Although this summary of key personnel and organizations
is decidedly limited, it represents a concerted effort to
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identify some of the principle architects and associations
affiliated with issues of defense reform for the period
covered. The list is admittedly not all-inclusive, and
research constraints inhibit such an ideal. However it is
perhaps useful at this junction to note that a number of
additional players are involved, and in order to preclude any
criticism of neglecting their viewpoints, their names and
vocations/affiliations are appended as Appendix B.
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III. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE 1970
A. THE VIETNAM WAR
On the 20th of February 1970, the Presidential Assistant
for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, began
peace talks with representatives of the North Vietnamese
Government in Paris, France. These talks were aimed at
extricating America from what had become the longest and
potentially most divisive overseas military venture in U.S.
history. It would be an additional three years before a final
Vietnam Peace Pact was signed on 27 January 1973, and an
additional two years after that before all U.S. forces were
finally extricated from Vietnam with the fall of the Saigon
Government on 30 April 1975. (Summ.ers, 1985, pp. 52, 57, 59)
More than 50,000 American servicemen died in that war.
Residual effects of the conflict's negative public image would
effectively drive two presidents from office and resulted in
a national schism that has since been described by some
authors as an expansion of "the great divorce" between "the
other America of Defense" (i.e., the military) and the
American people, in particular the social and intellectual
elites of America. (Hadley, 1986, p. 52)
A critical element of the American military effort during
the war was the employment of an attrition strategy that
essentially involved the use of heavy firepower in combatting
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Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars in South
Vietnam. Effective though it was in attriting the enemy, it
alienated the American public because of its immense
destructive power and its apparent inability to lessen the
opposition's will to fight. (Summers, 1985, p. 359)
Additionally because of the continued high cost of the
war, both in terms of economics and in terms of manpower, and
the less than candid image projected by American civilian and
military leaders concerning this cost, considerable domestic
opposition to the government's wartime policies developed
among the American people. This public discontent was in a
large measure directed towards the U.S. military. Events came
to a tragic head on 4 May 1970 at Kent State University in
Ohio.
As with many college campuses across the country at that
time, student disturbances had broken out at Kent State
University in opposition to a recent U.S. military "incursion"
from South Vietnam into neighboring "neutral" Cambodia. After
student protestors torched the Kent State University ROTC
building, Ohio Governor James Rhodes called out the Army
National Guard to restore order. In the ensuing melee, a
group of poorly disciplined Army Guardsmen, under harassment
from the crowd, fired their rifles at the demonstrators,
killing four, including an Army ROTC cadet. This incident
sparked massive nationwide protests against both the
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continuing Vietnam war effort and the U.S. military's
association with that effort. (Summers, 1985, p. 215)
By far the greatest cost to the American military of the
war in Vietnam was the shift in values of the American people.
Support for the military was simply not forthcoming. Public
recognition that a functional military requires extraordinary
performance and cultural support was denied. This denial can
be attributed to many factors, but one in particular stands
out. This factor concerns the public's perceived infringement
of its right to receive accurate military information during
the course of the war, especially in terms of casualty reports
and conduct of the war, even if that information was sensitive
enough to have an impact on the capacity of the military to
fulfill its objectives. More than any other single issue in
the great debates that raged during the Vietnam era, this
issue eroded the special trust that exists between any nation
and its military. (Summers, 1985, p. 215)
B. KEY EVENTS SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR
In the 20 years since the initial American drawdown in
Vietnam in 1969-70, the U.S. military launched no fewer than
five major military operations to apply force in support of
the government's foreign policy objectives.^ These operations
were: (1) the raid on Sontay prison in North Vietnam to
^U.S. military personnel strength in Vietnam peaked at
543,400 on 30 April 1969. (Summers, 1985, p. 50)
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rescue 70 American POW s alleged to have been held there; (2)
the rescue of the crew of the S.S. Mayaguez in Cambodia in
1975; (3) the mission into Iran in 1980 to rescue the hostages
held at the American embassy in Teheran; (4) the participation
in the multinational force in Lebanon from 1982 to 1983 in
support of the Gemayel government; and (5) the invasion of
Grenada in the Caribbean in 1983 in order to topple a hostile
regime and replace it with one more accommodating to U.S.
interests. In each of these instances the U.S. military
demonstrated a need for reform by either failing to accomplish
its mission or else by mounting operations characterized by
serious shortcomings in military technique. (Gabriel, 1985,
p. 5) The five operations and their outcomes are briefly
described as follows.
1. The Sontav Prison Raid
In the early morning hours of Saturday, 21 November
1970, a 56-man special operations assault force under the
command of U.S. Army Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons raided the
Sontay prison camp located about 30 miles west of Hanoi, the
capitol of North Vietnam. Sontay was a North Vietnamese POW
compound alleged by some U.S. intelligence analysts to have
held approximately 70 American pilots as prisoners.
The raid was the first major military operation
planned directly by the JCS, and the planning staff was drawn
from all military services and included representatives from
the major intelligence agencies. Stateside training for the
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raid had begun six months earlier at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida, and the assigned mission of the assault force was to
liberate and retrieve the Americans held as POW's.
The raid itself was a perfect application of military
technique, from the initial launch of the heliborne assault
force at Udorn Air Force Base in Thailand, to its final
recovery; none of the assault force were killed or wounded.
But there were no American servicemen to rescue. Upon arrival
at Sontay, the raid force found the compound to be void of
POW's. However, in the course of the raid the assault force
did kill an exceptionally large number of personnel who were
later revealed by intelligence sources to be Russian and
Chinese advisors that had been housed in a nearby barracks.
The POW's had been moved four months earlier, and the
after-action report would show that Defense Intelligence
Agency analysts were aware of that information. The only
people involved who were not aware that the camp was empty
were the members of the raid force itself.
Thus, a bold plan, with realistic training, and near
flawless execution, failed to achieve its objective due to an
intelligence dissemination failure. Post-raid analysis
attributed this failure to the JCS command structure, which
demonstrated that once it was committed to a course of action
based on bureaucratic consensus, it was unable to recognize
the validity of contrary data, and terminate an operation that
36
had achieved a momentum of its own. (Gabriel, 1985, pp. 35-
60)
2 . The Mavaquez Rescue
On Tuesday, 15 May 1975, approximately 225 U.S.
Marines of Battalion Landing Team 2/9, embarked in U.S. Air
Force helicopters from Utapo Air Force Base Thailand,
assaulted Koh Tang Island, Cambodia in an attempt to rescue
the civilian crew of the S.S. Mayaguez. The S.S. Mayaguez was
an American merchant ship that had three days earlier been
seized in an act of piracy on the high seas by the Cambodian
Navy. Unknown to the assault force, the 3 9 American merchant
crewmen of the Mayaguez had already been released through
international diplomatic efforts, and in the ensuing assault
on what turned out to be a heavily defended island, 18 men
were lost (including three bodies left behind), and 50 men
were wounded.^ Post-incident reports cite commanders with
risking the lives of 250 Marines, Sailors and Airmen in a
pointless venture to rescue a crew that was already safe.
Additionally, the military intelligence community was cited
for failing to provide accurate and timely combat intelligence
^Different casualty figures have been cited by various
researchers for this incident. Hart and Lind cite the figure
of 41 U.S. Marine KIA's to rescue 4 Mayaguez crewmen. (Hart
1986, p. 2) These are figures which may have been taken from
initial media reports. Gabriel cites figures taken from
official DOD casualty reports, which may or may not be more
precise.
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as to the nature and disposition of hostile forces on the
island. (Gabriel, 1986, p. 83)
3 . The Iran Rescue Mission
On 24 April 1980, combined American military forces
launched an attempted special operations rescue mission to
liberate the 53 American hostages who had previously been
seized by Iranian militants at the American embassy in
Teheran, Iran in November 1979. Proceeding to a clandestine
intermediate refueling site (code named "Desert One") in the
middle of the Iranian Dasht-e-Kavir desert, the airborne/
heliborne rescue force was allegedly crippled by the failure
of a sufficient number of Navy CH-53 helicopters to arrive at
the refueling site to continue with the mission. Subsequently
an on-site decision to abort the mission was made and
concurred with by National Command Authorities. In the
ensuing departure confusion at Desert One, a Marine-piloted
helicopter collided with a parked Air Force C-130, and the
resultant explosion and fire claimed the lives of eight U.S.
servicemen and ultimately resulted in the compromise of
American plans to rescue the hostages. This event has been
described as a watershed in marking the decline of American
military prestige and competence and dramatized the inability
of U.S. military planners to conceive and execute a military
operation even though they had almost six months to organize
it. (Hadley, 1986, pp. 3-28)
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4.
The Multinational Force in Lebanon
On Sunday, 23 October 1983, American Marines, as part
of a multinational "peacekeeping" force at Beirut
International Airport, were hit by a terrorist truck bomb
attack which resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. servicemen,
and over 100 wounded. The ensuing public outcry eventually
resulted in the "redeployment" of all U.S. forces out of
Lebanon. A subsequent examination of events in Lebanon during
the 533 days of U.S. presence revealed a high degree of
incompetence and failure in the application of military
technique. The implication was that the American military had
great difficulty executing operations for which it planned or
in adjusting plans to changing circumstances. This failure
has been attributed to a U.S. military structure that is
heavily bureaucratized, and that diffuses responsibility,
often resulting in such a tragic separation of execution and
planning. (Gabriel, 1986, pp. 117-146)
5. The Grenada Invasion
On Tuesday, 25 October 1983, Operation "Urgent Fury"
began. This was a combined U.S. military invasion of the
island of Grenada in the Caribbean, involving all branches of
the American armed forces, including elements of the
clandestine Delta Force. Coming hard on the heels of the
Beirut airport bombing debacle, the invasion was launched by
the Reagan administration as a political operation
orchestrated to convey an impression of U.S. military
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credibility, with the ostensible purpose of preventing nearly
800 American students at the island's medical school from
falling hostage to the local government's new revolutionary
regime. The regime was alleged by the Reagan Administration
to have had all the trappings of a Soviet proxy.
Moving against what was later considered to be
marginal opposition, a number of glaring shortcomings were
revealed in the American military structure during the
subsequent three-day operation. These shortcomings included:
1. Intelligence—Intelligence failed to provide adequate
information about the location and strength of enemy
positions
.
2. Ground Forces—With a substantial numerical advantage
the U.S. Army ground advance was much too slow to
effectively neutralize enemy opposition, and there was
a clear failure to seize enemy strong points suddenly
and in depth. There was a high proportion of non-
hostile fire deaths and injuries compounded by
inadequate medical facilities and treatment. Heat
exhaustion was extensive and caused in part by the use
of new heavy battle dress fatigues.
3
.
Command and Control—Command and Control appeared to
have been conducted more to give each of the services an
opportunity to get in on the show rather than to
successfully conduct a combined exercise. (Gabriel,
1986, pp. 149-186)
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This summary of the U.S. military record since 1970
reveals a trend of mixed success, for example, in Vietnam, the
methods prescribed by the political order for waging the war
were highly successful in attaining their objectives, i.e.,
attriting the enemy and obtaining a significant "body count."
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However, continual battlefield successes, waged in accordance
with politically prescribed methods and means, seemed to have
no relative bearing on the eventual outcome of the war and
ultimately may have contributed to its adverse conclusion.
Furthermore, it seemed there were few attractive mechanisms
available that could have prescribed alternative methods of
waging the war that might have been more suitable in attaining
the established policy objectives of the conflict.
In Grenada, on the other hand, the political objectives
were clearly attained. However, the battlefield performance
of a well-trained and well-equipped force, with few
politically imposed engagement restrictions, left much to be
desired.
These examples of a potentially adverse trend have been
greatly magnified in the eyes of the attentive public who
share significant concerns about national defense. A long
string of military failures or irrelevant successes is
frequently cited as the most important reason we need a new
defense structure, a structure that will enhance the
military's operational style in order to successfully achieve
national security objectives. A military system that
consistently fails to achieve stated objectives in support of
national policy is seen by many as endangering the existence
of the nation it supports. (Hart, 1986, p. 3)
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IV. DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF REFORM EFFORTS
The ineffective^ nature of the military operations
discussed in Chapter III established the context in which a
like-minded group of analysts and writers, introduced in
Chapter II, joined together to effectively galvanize public
opinion around the issue of military reform. The events
previously described and the actions of these and other
individuals associated with reform efforts can perhaps best be
conceptualized in terms of a chronology which highlights the
dates of the critical incidents, the publication dates of
reformers' books and articles, and the dates of the specific
actions taken in support of defense reform by both the
reformers and affiliated public policy entrepreneurs who were
in a position to affect reform efforts.
A. THE CORE GROUP
In the late 1970 's five of the individuals (see below)
profiled in Chapter II came together to form what has been
described by one of their members. Bill Lind, as "the core
^Author's note: "As used here, efficiency is an
economically-oriented term referring to the assembling of a
military asset at a minimum of cost or waste. Effectiveness,
however, is a militarily-oriented term referring to the
ability of a military force to fight and defeat enemy forces."
(Barlow, 1981, p. 2)
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group of the military reform movement." (Interview Lind,
1989)
While conceding that defense reform efforts had multiple
inputs,^ Lind credits this group with generating the most
significant impact on military reform efforts at that time,
through their unique ability to create an awareness and forge
a political consensus which ultimately resulted in defense
legislation and defense policies that reflected many of their
reform ideas. (Interview Lind, 1989)
According to Lind, "the core group" consisted of himself,
John Boyd, Steven Canby, Norman Polmar, Pierre Sprey, and
several others^ Their activities are perhaps best amplified
^In the late 1970 's and early 1980 's Lind was reluctant
to identify prominent active duty officers who were
sympathetic to military reform efforts. He felt that they
should remain anonymous to preclude career isolation and
suppression. (Interview Lind, 1989) However two who have
since been identified and can be named are: then-Lieutenant
Colonel Michael Wyly USMC, who was instrumental in introducing
the doctrine of maneuver warfare into the Marine Corps'
Amphibious Warfare School in 1982, and then-Major General
Alfred Grey USMC, who introduced maneuver warfare as doctrine
for the Second Marine Division in 1981. (Hart and Lind, 1986,
p. 38)
^Civilian reformers inside the Defense Department
identified by Lind are Franklin C. "Chuck" Spinney, a budget
analyst, and A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management systems
specialist, and author of The Pentagonists . (Hart and Lind,
1986, p. 8) Reformers outside the Defense Department
mentioned by Lind include: Dr. Jeffery Record, a prominent
author on national security affairs and a former aide to
Senator Sam Nunn ; Dina Rasor, a defense procurement
consultant, Paul Hoven, a former helicopter pilot in Vietnam;
and Joe Burnice, who worked for the reform-oriented Project on
Military Personnel; and Drs. Richard Gabriel, author of




by Lind in a number of his writings. Lind defines the
objective of the military reform movement as: "an attempt to
discover the root causes of our military failures, develop the
ideas necessary for restoring military effectiveness, and turn
those ideas into policy." (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 4)
John Boyd is described by Lind as being the intellectual
patriarch of the core group, his brief Patterns of Conflict
is cited as containing a substantial portion of much of the
original military theory developed in this century. Boyd's
emphasis on being able to modify one's own movements in combat
faster than an enemy can react to them, and the application
of this notion to the full range of thinking, strategy, force
planning and tactics, is a key element in the proposed
strategy of the reform movement. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 6)
Dr. Steven Canby is described by Lind as the tactician
among the core group of military reformers. His expertise and
contributions have come in his knowledge and writings on small
unit infantry tactics and in his strident opposition to
reliance on a doctrine of positional defense and attrition
warfare. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 7)
Pierre Sprey is the hardware reformer in Bill Lind ' s core
group. He is credited with placing an emphasis on the
understanding that the highest price technology is not
necessarily the most effective in combat. To provide a basis
for the improvement of weapons, Pierre Sprey has pioneered the
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use of accurate combat history to derive crucial effectiveness
characteristics. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 8)
Norman Polmar, not profiled in Chapter II, is a Washington
based contributing editor for the publication Janes' Fighting
Ships . and is credited by Lind as being a naval and aerospace
analyst for the group. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 7)
Although not considered by Lind to be a member of "the
core group," Army Colonel Harry G. Summers is credited by Lind
as being the principle writer who initially pointed out a
number of the lessons of our ten year war in South East Asia.
(Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 1) In reviewing Summers' book On
Strategy; The Vietnam War in Context , published in 1981, Lind
states that Summers effectively argued that we confused
preparing for war, with the conduct of war, and that our
strategy was essentially budget-driven and primarily a
function of resource allocation. Thus, in spite of our
commitment of billions of dollars into technologically complex
weapons systems, we were beaten by an opponent who had a more
realistic view of war and relied on strategy, tactics, and
simplicity (p. 2).
As evidence of the linkage of "the core group" both Lind
and Canby cite the group's collective writings in the
document. Reforming the Military , which was published by the
Heritage Foundation in 1981. (Interviews Lind and Canby,
1989) This document contains individual essays written by
each of these individuals, plus an essay by Luttwak, which
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argue that the way to improve the fighting effectiveness of
our general purpose forces is not to spend more money on them,
but to restructure the way they are organized, equipped, and
employed. (Barlow, 1981, p. iv)
Additional acknowledgement of the close association of
"the core group" was provided by their later public testimony
in Congress^ and the group's public recognition as described
in the media by such individuals as former Under Secretary of
the Navy Woolsey and John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of
political science at the University of Chicago. (Interview
Lind, 1989)
Woolsey, in his 1981 editorial in the Washington Post
entitled, "Billions for Defense," states, "The Godfathers of
the reform movement are John Boyd, a retired Air Force pilot;
Bill Lind, on Senator Gary Hart's staff; consultant Steve
Canby; and one or two others." (Woolsey, 1891)
Mearsheimer, in his article, "The Military Reform
Movement: A Critical Assessment," published in ORBIS Forum in
1983, lists Lind, Luttwak, Canby and Fallows as being among
his grouping of "The self-styled military reform movement."
(Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 285)
®Later findings of the group's joint testimony in Congress
includes such examples as the joint testimony by Record and
Summers on 27 January 1987. (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, pp. 705,
714)
46
1. Summary of Findings Concerning the Core Group
As a core group these reformers have strongly
criticized past land warfare doctrine that emphasized the role
of heavy firepower and attrition. Far better, they say, to
emphasize rapid maneuver and small independent units that can
penetrate and disrupt an enemies' forces. To this end, they
also stress the importance of experienced and cohesive
military units to exploit opportunities on the battlefield.
Theirs is an emphasis on war that is real.
For the maritime environment, the reformers have
emphasized the importance of being able to modernize a ship's
weapons quickly. They acknowledge the importance of sea-based
aviation, but they want that flexibility for most ships, not
just a few big, and in their eyes highly vulnerable, aircraft
carriers. Hence they have pushed for the spreading of
aircraft to a large number of combatants and for the
development of modular weapons and sensors to speed up ship
modernization.
This core group of military reformers has originated
from sources far different than the traditional systems
analysis approach to military matters. They emphasize
strategy, not mathematical models; bold innovation, not
marginal changes; and military history, not management. In
their writings they are impatient with the slow pace of change
in the U.S. military and civilian bureaucracies, and as a rule
they do not accept what they perceive as a mechanical passing
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on of doctrine from one military generation to the next. They
do not perceive military breakthroughs will come by the
addition of larger more expensive weapons tied to cumbersome
logistics. (Woolsey, 1981)
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS
A second major development of reform efforts at this time
was the formation of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus
in June and July 1981. (Interview Lind, 1989)
As profiled in Section B of Chapter II, the reform caucus
has been the primary organizational vehicle or coordinating
mechanism of political forces that have been effective in
implementing the core group's principle ideas. It has
provided a critical forum for the translation of proposals and
issues into programs and policies. As described by one
bureaucratic entrepreneur, Michael R. Burns (see Chapter
II. A), the Congressional Military Reform Caucus came to
fruition as a result of the key event at Desert One in Iran
in 1980 (see Chapter III.B). Mr. Burns feels that this
incident was an apocalyptic event within congressional circles
in Washington. It provided the catalyst that caused many
congressmen from both sides of the aisle to arrive at the
heartfelt conclusion that something was indeed wrong with the
American National Security Establishment. In Mr. Burns' view
this event caused efforts to coalesce with regard to defense
reform in the Congress.
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Hence the time was right in late 1981 for the
implementation of much of what the core group of reformers was
arguing for. Several general themes with respect to defense
reform began to emerge from the Congress that gave form and
substance to the reformers' activities.
A number of Congressman became interested in hearing
Colonel Boyd's lengthy presentation "Patterns of Conflict."
Mr. Burns refers to this as the "acid test" of a member's
commitment to the concept of defense reform. He additionally
cites the work of Colonel Everest Richione USAF (Retired)
concerning U.S. Air Force Fighter operations in Vietnam, and
the work of Colonel Robert Dilger USAF (Retired) concerning
the AX fighter,^ as being crucibles in developing Congressional
thought on defense reform, with an attempt to translate reform
theories into practice. (Interview, Burns 1989)
1. Summary of Findings Concerning the Congressional
Military Reform Caucus
The Congressional Military Reform Caucus has served as
both an educational tool to bring about change, and as an
implementer of change through its ability to directly affect
^The AX fighter concept ultimately evolved into the A-10
aircraft, and its developmental evolution is frequently cited
as an example of the reformers' efforts to curtail the USAF's
frequent over-emphasis on extensive, over-priced technology.
In this case the Air Force was forced to recognize the merits
of a limited technology derived from a data base that
incorporated "real world" battlefield requirements for a
central European scenario. In their presentations. Colonel
Dilger and Pierre Sprey utilized data obtained from research
conducted by Russel Stolfi, second reader for this thesis.
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the larger congress as a whole with respect to the passage of
defense related legislation. Its mere existence has provoked
reactions from those within the defense establishment that
have ranged from denunciation to enthusiastic acceptance.
(Marsh, 1982, p. 55) While loosely structured and very
diverse, the caucus' membership, in keeping with the
philosophy of the core group of reformers, has generally
supported the use of advanced technology, but not technology
that is complex and cumbersome. (Interview Lind, 1989)
The caucus developed an options committee in late 1981
that received formal input from Lind, Canby, Boyd and Sprey.
This input resulted in a formal list that was entitled:
"Options For Action on the Fiscal 1983 Defense Budget." While
never actually implemented in its entirety, the list addressed
general defense policy and some specific weapons programs, and
established a direction for future caucus activity. ^° (Marsh,
1982, p. 56) In the ensuing years the caucus has continued to
work in this manner by developing options from various inputs
and then attempting to implement through legislative action.
(Interview Lind, 1989)
^°Some options on this 1983 list included: Cancelling the
F-18, Transferring offensive mine warfare from the Navy to the
Air Force, Building "stealth' fast missile boats for the Navy
and Cancelling the Lockheed C-5. None of these options were
ever implemented.
One option on the list that was implemented was an
option to support an inexpensive ground support aircraft for
the Air National Guard. This was essentially accomplished
with the A-10. (Marsh, 1982, p. 56)
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The success of the reform caucus can be measured in
two ways, first in their legislative successes, which will be
discussed in the next chapter, and second in the future
placement of its membership in positions to influence the
defense establishment.
Of the original 1982 membership shown in Appendix A,
it is significant to note the eventual shift of two members to
the executive branch of government, and their subsequent rise
to appointed positions of leadership in U.S. military affairs.
Robin L. Beard (R. Tenn) , an original caucus member
and a reserve Colonel in the Marine Corps, was eventually
defeated for his house seat in 1984 and was subsequently
appointed by President Reagan as a U.S. Representative to the
NATO Council of Ministers in Belgium, not an insignificant
position from which to influence the U.S.' NATO military
policy particularly with respect to doctrine.
Most recently, former Representative Richard B. Cheney
(R. Wyo) was appointed by President Bush to succeed Frank
Carlucci as Secretary of Defense. (CIS, Vol. 20, March 1989,
p. 72)
Additionally, several members of the caucus have risen
to significant leadership positions within the Congress
itself. As of this writing Representative Newt Gingrich (R.
Ga) , the son of a career Army infantryman, and in Lind's eyes
"one of the most active members of the reform caucus," is a
key member of the House Armed Services Committee, overseeing
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principle legislation dealing with defense related budgetary
and personnel matters. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 265) Senator
Sam Nunn (D. Ga . ) is currently the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services committee. (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, p. II)
Senator John Warner (D. Va) sits on the Senate Armed Services
Committee's Naval Affairs Subcommittee, and has thus developed
a significant influence in the area of naval shipbuilding.
(S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, P. II)
Although the founders of the reform caucus—Senator
Gary Hart and Representative Whitehurst—have since retired
from the Congress, both continue to be active in a number of
defense-related seminars and conferences. Hart, a foirmer
Colorado senator, was a frontrunner in the 1988 presidential
campaign until a furor over his private life altered his
standing, and he dropped out of the race altogether.
Dr. G. William Whitehurst, a professor of history at
Old Dominion University from 1950 to 1968, and again from 1987
to the present, served nine terms in congress as Representa-
tive from the Second District of Virginia, from 1968 to 1987.
In his congressional career he eventually arose to become the
second ranking Republican on the House Armed Services
Committee. He too remains active in defense affairs, most
recently serving on the conference staff of a seminar on
Soviet Military Doctrine at Old Dominion University in May
1989. (Grassey, 1989)
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C. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 198 3
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 1983
included an amendment to strengthen the weapons testing
process. This amendment established the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Operational Testing and Evaluation (Asst SecDef
OT&E) . (H.A.S.C. No. 97-33, 1983)
Described by Lind as the first major legislative success
of the military reform effort, the act had the effect of
establishing for the first time a central office for the
coordination and testing of proposed military weapons systems
under real world field conditions. Additionally the act
included provisions for actual live firing of proposed weapons
prior to their acceptance by the military. (Hart and Lind,
1986, p. 9)
Since this initial success, there have been a number of
smaller legislative attainments that have occurred based on
the improved data obtained from this new weapons testing
structure. These successes include providing some better
equipment for the Reserves and National Guard, such as the F-
18 Aircraft, mandating warranties on some types of military
equipment, providing estimates of what a weapons system should
cost early in a program so that future price increases are
easily detected, and ultimately in 1983, forcing the
cancellation of the Army's Sergeant York close-in air defense
weapons system by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.
(Lind, 1986, p. 10)
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D. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986
On 7 May 198 6 the Congress passed the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act^\ better known as the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, after its two primary sponsors in the Senate
(Senator Barry Goldwater, R. Arizona) and House
(Representative Bill Nichols, D. Alabama)
.
As noted in Chapter IV, this act essentially incorporates
a number of the recommendations of the Packard Commission and
establishes them as public law. A Packard Commission member
who provided congressional testimony supporting the act was
Woolsey, and additional supporting testimony was provided by
reform proponents Luttwak, and General Meyer. (H.A.S.C. No.
99-53, 1987, pp. IV, V) House and Senate Armed Services
Committee members supporting passage of this act included the
original Defense Reform Caucus members Nunn and Gingrich,
(Appendix A) and new Reform Caucus members Boxer and Roth.
(Morrison, 1989, p. 46)
The Act stresses the civilian supremacy of the President
as Commander in Chief and spells out the role of the Secretary
of Defense, providing him with increased power "within the
Department of Defense on any matter which the Secretary
chooses to act." (Goldwater, 1988, p. 354)
The major institutional changes the Act imposed on the
Department of Defense are as follows:
11Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986
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1. The act greatly strengthened the JCS Chairman in setting
policies, drafting military strategies, and shaping
Pentagon budgets. The Chairman was established as the
senior ranking officer in the U.S. Military and the
entire joint staff would henceforth answer to him alone.
(HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 1048)
2. The act established a four star deputy chairman of the
JCS, reporting to the chairman, who would become acting
head in the absence of the chairman. (HASC No. 99-53,
1986, p. 878)
3. The act retained ten basic commands, and added statutory
provisions that considerably strengthened these
commands, giving them much greater control over
resources and personnel to support their missions. In
a major change, Navy and Marine Corps Officers now
assigned to these commands are responsible directly to
their field commanders, not their service chiefs at the
Pentagon. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 878)
4. The act established a career specialty for officers on
joint duty assignment and clearly hinged future
assignments and promotions on joint duty. Procedures
were established to monitor the careers of joint duty
officers, and a record of joint duty would be needed for
consideration for flag rank. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p.
893)
5. The act establishes a new Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition. This "Acquisition Czar" is the Pentagon's
top procurement official, and is expected to attempt to
achieve considerable savings for the DOD through joint
purchases and other means. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, pp.
905-925)
In the words of its chief senate sponsor. Senator Barry
Goldwater
:
...the act is an attempt to renew the military's financial
and functional integrity. The chairman and the vice
chairman must now produce, in consultation with the
services, useful and timely advice to the President ... .More
than ever before, the commanders in chief in the field will
decide how to carry the war to the enemy, and the unified
commander will report directly to the President and Defense
Secretary. Separate ground, sea, and air warfare by
individual services is gone forever. (Goldwater, 1988, pp.
353-356)
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E. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS
On 20 August 1982, the U.S. Army substantially revised its
institutional doctrine in response to a number of pressures
for change that had been exerted by reform sources both
internal and external to the Army. (Interview Lind, 1989)
Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations , promulgated on that date,
contained a number of significant changes from past doctrine
and established a new thrust in the Army's way of thinking.
A few of the changes, chiefly the concept of the AirLand
Battle, maneuver-based tactics and the addition of the
operational level of war as a separate field of military
activity, stimulated a great deal of debate (Holder, 1985, p.
22), and clearly originated, at least in part, in response to
Lind's original critique of Army doctrine in March 1977.
(Lind, 1977, pp. 54-65) Additionally, Mearsheimer writes that
this 1982 version of FM 100-5,
...and a number of associated documents contain numerous
passages remarkably similar to various passages in the
reformers' writings. Luttwak for example, told the Wall
Street Journal that he was "startled to see" whole
paragraphs of his work showing up in the doctrine.
(Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 291)
FM 100-5, Operations , is:
...the Army's keystone warfighting manual. It explains how
Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations,
battles and engagements in connection with other services.
It furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate
doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional
education and individual and unit training. .. (it is) the
Army's principle tool of professional self-education in
science and the Art of War, and presents a stable body of
operational and tactical principles rooted in actual
military experience. (FM 100-5, 1986, p. i)
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The principle significance of the August 1982 edition of
FM 100-5, lies in its embracement of the three dimensional
"AirLand Battle" doctrine as the Army's new basic fighting
doctrine. In the eyes of its drafters, the doctrine reflects
"the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat
power, and the application of the classical principles of war
to contemporary battlefield requirements." (FM 100-5, 1986,
p. 9)
The AirLand Battle doctrine, in a departure from previous
doctrine, recognizes the importance of the operational level
of warfare, and its focus on the seizure and retention of the
initiative and its insistence on the requirement for
multiservice cooperation. Its basic tenants emphasizing
initiative, agility, depth, mission orders and
synchronization, establish a new style for combat, and set a
renewed stage for a joint service outlook that did not exist
before.
Additionally, FM 100-5 acknowledges the intangible factors
of combat power, such as the state of training of the forces
employed, troop motivation, leader's skill, firmness of
purpose and boldness. These are precisely the nonquantif iable
aspects of the moral dimension to defense thinking that Burns




That adaption of this document is indeed a major
institutional change^^ for the Army is reflected in the fact
that for all practical purposes, the study of operations ended
in the U.S. Army after WW II . It is alleged by some that this
was perhaps due to the advent of nuclear weapons, and the
common belief in the Army at that time, that these weapons of
mass destruction meant the end of conventional warfare. FM
100-5 counters that belief with a renewed emphasis on
operations as a vital link between grand strategy and minor
tactics, and provides an emphasis on war that recognizes the
fast-paced conventional nature of many potential conflicts.
(Holder, 1985, pp. 23-24)
Finally, FM 100-5 embraces the reformers' concept of
maneuver warfare as a dynamic measure of combat power, in a
manner that did not previously exist in Army Doctrine. The
old emphasis on firepower/attrition warfare that formerly
existed in Army doctrine is simply no longer there.
(Interview Canby, 1989) In its place is a recognition of
maneuver at both the operational and tactical levels. (FM
100-5, 1986, p. 11)
^^For the purposes of this research institutional changes
will be considered as those changes in structure or policy
that arose from the various military services themselves, as
a result of an increasing awareness by serving military
officers and appointed DOD officials of the need for new
strategies to address emerging problems.
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F. THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The push for the development of the U.S. Navy's Maritime
Strategy is credited to Edward Jayne, a reformer who operated
slightly earlier and outside of the circles of many of the
other reformers. Jayne, in his capacity as President Jimmy
Carter's Associate Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, gave a lecture at the Naval War College in February
1978 that "struck fear in the hearts of the admirals."
(Beatty, 1987, p. 37) At this lecture Jayne warned the Navy
that it had better come up with a strategic rationale to
justify its budget requests at a time when restoring the
credibility of our ground defense in Europe was an urgent
priority of U.S. foreign policy. Seapower supporters in the
audience heard Jayne with great skepticism and many felt that
his speech was "an exercise in intellectual arrogance by a
very young former Air Force Officer who knew next to nothing
about the Navy." (Canan, 1982, p. 45)
With this speech in mind, it is then alleged by Jack
Beatty, a journalist for the Atlantic Monthly , that the Navy's
leadership subsequently devised a maritime strategy that
responded to Jayne ' s critical lecture (Beatty, 1987, p. 37)
and to other criticisms of the Navy's "rigid traditionalism"
made by Lind and Polmar in 1978 (Hart, 1978, p. x)
.
What emerged was the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, first
published by then CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins in a U.S.
Naval Institute Supplement in January 1986. It has since been
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described as "the most definitive and authoritative statements
of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified
form." (Watkins, 1986, p. i)
The Watkins article is accompanied by companion pieces
authored by then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps General P. X. Kelly (with Major
Hugh K. O'Donnel Jr.). The espoused goal of the Maritime
Strategy is: "to use maritime power, in combination with the
efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to
bring about war termination on favorable terms." (Watkins,
1986, p. 3)
Described by Beatty as "the major change made in United
States war planning by the Reagan Administration," the
Maritime Strategy has been drawn from national objectives and
statements of national strategy, to form a cohesive policy
planning document for the Navy. (Beatty, 1987, p. 37) The
strategy has enjoyed widespread acceptance within Navy circles
and can essentially be broken down into three major
objectives.
The first objective is to destroy Soviet submarines in
their bastions before they can "surge" out into the
untrackable reaches of the Atlantic or Pacific where they
would cut sea lines of communication.
The second objective is to pin down Soviet ground and
tactical air forces at the far flung edges of the Russian land
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mass, and thus keep them from being shifted to what would be
the critical battle along the central front in Europe.
The third objective is to destroy not only the Soviet
attack submarines, but also Soviet ballistic missile
submarines, which can unleash nuclear annihilation. (Beatty,
1987, p. 38)
The central institutional change that this strategy
introduces into Navy thinking is that it switches the main
emphasis from a past defensive strategy of "sea control" to
an offensive strategy that seizes the initiative early in any
potential conflict with the Soviets, and carries the war to
them. The Maritime Strategy was conceived as a planning
document that emphasizes both forward offensive operations to
secure control of the seas, and "power projection" operations
against enemy forces or territory. (Watkins, 1986, p. 4-17)
That the strategy's authors acknowledged the provocation
and influence of the reformers in drafting this strategy is
seen in Lehman's off-the-cuff response to Hart and Lind's
criticisms of Navy Strategy when he stated: "I hope Gary
Hart's book gets a big sale... in the Soviet Union." (Beatty,
1987, p. 37)
G. FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL 1 WARFIGHTING
Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1) Warfighting , was
issued by Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M.
Gray, on 6 March 1989. This publication delivers a new
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doctrine to the Marine Corps that has been described as the
Commandants philosophy on warfighting. (Lloyd, 1989, p. 24)
As a background to understanding the origins of the
Commandant's philosophy it can be noted (see footnote #5
earlier in this chapter) that he developed a professional
rapport with Lind, Boyd and Canby during his tour as
Commanding General of the Marine Corp's Education Center from
1979 to 1982. He subsequently embraced many of the reformers
concepts of the operational art and maneuver warfare while
serving as Commanding General of the Second Marine Division
from 1982 to 1984, to the point of convening a maneuver
warfare board within the division to promulgate the concept.
(Interview Lind, 1989)
The stated objective of FMFM-1 is to describe a Marine
Corps philosophy for the preparation and conduct of war. It
describes an "understanding of the characteristics, problems
and demands of war, and derives a theory about war based on
that understanding. This theory in turn provides the
foundation for how (the Marine Corps) prepare (s) for war and
how (it) wages war." The book "does not contain specific
techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides
broad guidance in the form of concepts and values." (FMFM 1,
1989, p. i)
That the book represents a major institutional change for
the Marine Corps, and is a tribute to the efforts of the
military reform group is seen in its wholehearted embracement
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of the concept of maneuver warfare a la Lind et al. (FMFM 1,
1989, p. 58) An example of this is seen in reference to
Boyd's OODA loop in the document's discussion of concentration
and speed. (FMFM-1, 1989, p. 31)
In summary FMFM-1 represents the embracement of a new
style of warfighting for the Marine Corps, and a departure
from some past concepts of the Corps' forte of amphibious
warfare. ("Indeed the word amphibious is not even mentioned
in the document." (Lloyd, 1989, p. 24)) The document has had
its critics within the Marine Corps, ^^ but thus far their
criticisms have been primarily in the realm of semantics and
terminology, and not in the overall concepts embraced by the
publication.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
A summary of the chronology provided in this chapter is
contained in Appendix C.
^^Marine Corps Gazette . November 1989, Lloyd p. 24,
Schmitt p. 25, Robeson p. 27.
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V. ANALYSIS
The failure of the presidentially-made war in Vietnam, and
the mixed success of several of the military operations
subsequently undertaken in support of national objectives
ended public deference to what had been a relatively exclusive
executive control of the U.S. Department of Defense. In this
environment the public was receptive to new ideas concerning
defense structure and policy. These ideas were generated and
promulgated by a group of policy intellectuals who sensed the
ineffectiveness of the established style of defense
operations. Their ideas were eventually well-received by
bureaucratic and political entrepreneurs within the defense
decision making apparatus who were able to translate the ideas
into substance and effect structural and policy change.
As a consequence Congress passed several acts of
legislation to change a Department of Defense felt to have
grown too ineffective and too independent. The intention was
to get Congress more involved in the defense oversight
process. Additionally, within the Defense Department, a
number of change agents who were receptive to new ideas,
eventually moved into positions where they were able to
institute, by administrative fiat, significant policy changes
reflecting the innovative concepts generated by the policy
intellectuals.
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This phenomenon can be explored in more detail by
examining the cause and effect relationships established in
the following sequence of activities.
First, the Vietnam War, and the five subsequent military
operations undertaken in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy
objectives, established the context in which a desire for
defense reform was apparent. General dissatisfaction with the
ineffective manner in which the war and the subsequent
military operations were conducted characterized this context.
Second, concepts (e.g., The Operational Art of War,
Maneuver Warfare etc.) were generated in response to this
context by a number of public policy intellectuals. A few of
these individuals established a core group, based on their
desire to pursue a common goal, defense reform. This core
group articulated proposed solutions to serious military
problems that prevailing defense policies were unable to
handle.
The policy intellectuals were supported in their efforts
at concept generation by several organizations often referred
to as think tanks (CSIS, The Heritage Foundation etc.), which
were important for several reasons. First the think tanks
provided a funding base to support the policy intellectuals.
Secondly, they provided the policy intellectuals with an
essential vehicle from which to debate and build on one
another's ideas. And finally, the think tanks lent
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credibility and prestige to the promulgation of the reformers'
ideas.
One ad hoc organization that was also associated with
concept generation was the Packard Commission which, although
not necessarily affiliated with other reformers, moved on a
parallel track with them in so far as serving as a vehicle for
concept generation.
The third activity in this sequence involved policy
formulation based on the concepts generated. The defense
decision structure, which included a like-minded network of
appointed and elected officials who shared an interest in
defense reform, provided the vehicle from which to accomplish
the translation of concepts into outcomes. Subcomponents of
the two parts (the Congress and the executive branch) of this
decision structure were critical in effecting this
translation. The Defense Reform Caucus of the Congress was a
political force receptive to the reformers ideas that served
to focus discussion on the sensitive issues under considera-
tion and provide support in the form of political
entrepreneurs
.
On the executive side of the decision structure, the
eventual rise of reform-minded supporters to positions of
influence as executive entrepreneurs in their own
organizations contributed to the formulation of policies that
embraced the ideas of the original reformers. Two of the more
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prominent executive entrepreneurs referred to in this study
were Generals Meyer of the Army and Grey of the Marine Corps.
Finally, the outcomes produced by policy formulation
derived from the legislative component of the decision
structure and administrative fiat from the executive. These
outcomes reflected the concepts generated by the original
reformers (policy intellectuals) , and in several instances
they provided public testimony in support of those outcomes
(i.e., hearings testimony by Luttwak and Fitzgerald).
Additionally, in several instances the drafters of the
legislative initiatives acknowledged the source of their
inputs (i.e., Goldwater's acknowledgement of the influence of
the Packard Commission findings)
.
For the purposes of clarifying the interconnectivity of
these sequential activities. Figure 1 presents a flow diagram
as an analytic model that graphically illustrates the flow of
events described above.
Starting on the lower left side of the figure, we begin
with the context from which the resultant sequence of
activities flow. Next, moving up and to the right, is the
concept generation phase as the source of solutions to serious
military problems perceived during previous operations.
Continuing up and to the right in the diagram, policy
formulation is the focal point for the culmination of
concepts generated, translated, and fashioned into final
67

















Core Group of Policy Intellectuals
Packard Commission








Figure 1. Analytic Model of Defense Reform
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outcomes, which consisted of legislative enactments and
administrative fiat.
This analytic model of defense reform has similarities to
other topologies of public entrepreneurship such as the one
developed for state education reform by Roberts and King in
August 1989. (Roberts and King, 1989, p. 13)
The sequence of activities provided in the model above
points to the major finding of this study. The concepts
generated by policy intellectuals within the context of the
post-Vietnam era did have a considerable effect on subsequent
defense structure and policy. There was linkage between this
generation of defense reform issues and final outcomes. Most
of these concepts were generated by civilians outside of the
defense establishment, and their success in introducing change
reveals that they had considerable impact on the effort to
achieve defense reform.
One may speculate, however, that the momentum of this
effort may now be limited by its very success. It is entirely
possible that the reformers and the congress are no more able
to exercise a great deal of influence now than in the past.
If anything, it can be argued that the defense reformers and
a receptive congress are fragmented in influence because of
the larger number of participants dealing with issues of
defense reform. This is due in part to the increase in
interest in issues of defense reform. Witness the
proliferation of publications listed in this study's
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bibliography that continue to offer new ideas for reform
(i.e., Fitzgerald's The Pentaaonists (1989), Gansler's
Affording Defense (1989), and Fallows' More Like Us (1989)).
With this increase in the number of inputs, it becomes more
difficult to coordinate people, to achieve consensus and to
present a common view. Thus the ability of defense reformers
to act as a movement and to speak authoritatively with one
voice may have diminished, and often these people now appear
as more of a very loose confederation than as an organized
body. The former position seems to be more the case as one
observes this continuous effort of reformers in trying to
generate audience attention.
Nonetheless, defense reform efforts for the period 1970-
present have had a significant effect on the defense
establishment. A number of institutional and legislative
changes have been implemented that reflect the ideas of the
reformers, and the implementation of these ideas has directly





This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how reform
efforts have had an effect on the defense establishment's
structure and policy through an examination of the history of
defense reform from 1970 to the present. Major sources of
defense reform were identified, the context in which they
operated reviewed, and the outcomes of reform efforts
summarized.
This history reveals some important findings. First,
major wars and even minor military operations are catalysts
for change. There is a linkage between perceptions of the
outcome of the event (war) , new ideas generated as a result of
those perceptions, and actions taken by the nation's decision
making structure based on their receptiveness to those new
ideas. Second, of the defense reform concepts generated
during this period, all seemed to originate from sources
outside of the defense establishment. While some of these
sources may have at one time been affiliated with the defense
establishment (i.e., active duty service, defense consultant
etc.), it would appear that they were more adept at concept
generation while operating from the outside.
With respect to defense structure and policy, it should be
clear that defense reform efforts, as they occurred during
this period, did result in outcomes that had an effect on that
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structure and policy. An analytic model of defense reform was
offered to conceptualize this cause and effect relationship,
and it was noted that this model is similar to other models
in the field. Finally, it was speculated that because of an
apparent proliferation of interest in issues of defense
reform, continued efforts at reform may have a diminished
impact because of the difficulties of maintaining consensus
with a variety of inputs.
Limitations of the study preclude a thorough analysis of
all sources of reform; alternative sources may exist and
should be considered in order to complete a more thorough
analysis of the subject. Limitations, as noted in Chapter I,
include constraints on time and resource availability. Data
collection, for instance, was limited to a literature survey
and the use of personal interviews. An enhanced source of
data collection might include the use of a more complete
review of primary sources to develop long-term trends on the
activities of sources of defense reform. Additionally, this
study made no determination on the effectiveness of the
outcomes in terms of achieving the original goals of the
reformers. These would be two areas for future research to
document.
The findings of the study raise some important issues for
the U.S. Department of Defense. As with any organization, the
Defense Department faces two challenges. First, the need to
maintain its core values. Second, the need to adapt to
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external threats to its existence. Like all bureaucracies
that have a life of their own, the Defense Department is
resistant to change. Yet if it cannot renew itself, it may
undermine its own effectiveness in the long term. Thus an
infusion of ideas is needed to keep the organization alive and
capable of adapting. Hence the issue becomes one of balance,
how to foster and create an infusion of ideas, while at the
same time maintaining some singularity of voice that is often
necessary for the support of core values.
An answer to this dilemma cannot be provided here.
However, based on the implications of a study of this nature,
the following comments are perhaps appropriate.
In a world that is rapidly witnessing a new equation
between the west, the socialist bloc and the developing
countries, the U.S. must possess a credible military force if
it desires to maintain its place in the world order. The task
facing defense planners over the next decades, therefore, is
to recognize that broad trends are underway, and that there
is a need to continually "manage" defense affairs so that the
Defense Department is capable of dealing with uncertain
threats to U.S. national interests in an effective and
efficient manner.
An enlightened management of this nature requires a
continual injection of new ideas from either external or
internal sources, an understanding of the process of change,
and an appreciation that the problems of the Defense
73
Department are complex and require more than simplistic
solutions. Thus an awareness of how the defense reform
process operates and its subsequent effects on structure and
policy, is of critical importance to the defense decision
making leadership.
Given the considerable strength possessed by the U.S.
Department of Defense, it ought to be possible to continually
realign its structure and policies without any adverse long-
term effects. Therefore, an enhanced understanding of the
process of reform should be encouraged. The value of such an
understanding can be seen in terms of the opportunity it
affords an attentive management to evaluate alternative





MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS— 1982
The Senate Republicans are: William S. Cohen (Me.)/ Slade
Gorton (Wash.)/ Arlen Specter (Pa.), Ted Stevens (Alaska),
John W. Warner (Va.).
The Senate Democrats are: Gary Hart (Colo.), J. Bennett
Johnson, Jr. (La.), Carl Levin (Mich.), George Mitchell (Me.),
Sam Nunn (Ga.), Claiborne Pell (R. I.), David Pryor (Ark.),
Jim Sasser (Tenn.).
The House Democrats are: Donald J. Albosta (Mich.), Tony
Coelho (Calif.), Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), Norman D. Hicks
(Wash.), Byron L. Dorgan (N.D.), Vic Fazio (Calif.), Thomas
M. Fogllietta (Pa.), Martin Frost (Tex.), Dennis M. Hertel
(Mich.), James R. Jones (Okla.), Ton Lantos (Calif.), Dave
Mcurdy (Okla.), Stephen L. Neal (N.C.), Bruce F. Vento
(Minn. )
.
The House Republicans are: Robin L. Beard (Tenn.),
Douglas K. Bereuter (Neb.), Thomas J. Billey, Jr. (Va.),
William F. Clinger, Jr. (Pa.), Richard B. Cheney (Wyo.), Larry
E. Craig (Idaho), Lawrence J. Denardis (Conn.), Charles F.
Doughtery (Pa.), Jack Edwards (Ala.), David F. Emery (Me.),
Cooper Evans (Iowa), Paul Findley (111.), Newt Gingrich (Ga.),
Bill Green (N.Y.), Thomas F. Hartnett (S.C), John Hiller
(Ind.), Duncan Hunter (Calif.), Ken Kramer (Colo.), Bob
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Livingston (La.)» Dan Lungren (Calif. )» Marc L. Marks (Pa.)^
Lynn Martin (111.), James L. Nelligan (Pa.), Marge Roukema
(N.J.), Claudine Schneider (R.I.), Paul S. Trible, Jr. (Va.),
G. William Whitehurst (Va.). (Marsh, 1982, p. 55)
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AFFILIATED WITH ISSUES OF
DEFENSE REFORM 1970-PRESENT
Abshire, David M. , President, CSIS.
Barlow, Jeffery G. , National Security Analyst, Heritage
Foundation.
Burnice, Joe, Defense Analyst.
Canan, James, Author.
Fowles, James, Reporter.
Fitzgerald, A. Ernest, GS-18, Management Systems Deputy,
Office of the Comptroller of the Air Force.
Gabriel, Dr Richard A., Academic/Author
.
Gansler, Jacques S., Defense Analyst, The Analytical Services
Corporation. Formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Material Acquisition)
.
Grey, Alfred M. , General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
Hadley, Arthur T. , Soldier/Author/Journalist.
Henning, Charles Paul, Defense Economist.
Hoven, Paul, Defense Analyst.
Jones, David, General, Chairman, JCS, U.S. Air Force, Retired.
Martin, David C. , Author/Journalist
.
Meyer, Edward C. , General, (Ret.), Former Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army.
Meyers, Daniel J., Soldier/Author.
Polmar, Norman, Naval Author, Former Associate Editor, Janes
'
Fighting Ships .
Rasor, Dina, Defense Procurement Consultant.
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Record, Dr. Jeffrey, Senior Fellow, Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis.
Savage, Dr. Paul, Academic/Author.
Spinney, Franklin C. , Budget Analyst/Author.
Walcott, John, Author/Journalist.
Wyly, Michael, Colonel USMC, Author.
Woolsey, James R.
,




CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN DEFENSE
REFORM SINCE 1970
Key military operations which provided the context for
reform are highlighted in toold. Major actions taken by the
various policy intellectuals, or bureaucratic and political
entrepreneurs, to heighten public awareness of the situation
are indicated by an asterisk. The remainder of the chronology
consists of some of the principle legislative and
institutional changes affecting defense structure and policy
that were generated during this period.
The chronology establishes a sequence of certain events
preceding others, and as a result of this sequence, it
attempts to support a cause and effect relationship between
the events.
21 November 1970—Son Tay Prison Raid executed by U.S. Forces
into North Vietnam. No prisoners found to be rescued.
30 April 1975
—
North Vietnamese Army captures Saigon, Vietnam
War Ends.
15 May 1975—Mayaguez Rescue Mission executed at Ko Tang
Island, Cambodia. Eighteen U.S. Servicemen killed, 50
wounded .
March 1977--William S. Lind publishes his critical appraisal
of Army Doctrine in 100-5, in Military Review .*
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February 1978—Edward R. Jayne presents a critical lecture on




The White Paper on Defense (1978 Edition) by
Senators Robert Taft Jr. and Gary Hart, with the assistance
of Lind, is published. This paper calls for comprehensive
debate on the underlying concepts of the defense
establ ishment .
*
24 April 1980—Iran Rescue mission aborted at "Desert One," 8
U.S. Servicemen killed, hostage rescue plans compromised.
1981--The critical issues booklet, Reforming the Military , is
published by the Heritage Foundation. This publication
contains essays by reformers Luttwak, Canby, Polmar, Lind,
and Sprey.*
20 August 1982—FM 100-5 is published as a new Army doctrine
by the Department of the Army. This doctrine embraces
concepts of the operational art of war and maneuver warfare
which were originally proposed by Lind in the March 1977
issue of Military Review . Additional doctrinal concepts
proposed by Canby and Luttwak are also incorporated.
October 1982—The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal 1983 implemented. The Act contained an amendment to
establish The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Test and Evaluation, in an effort to strengthen
the weapons testing process. This act was attributed by
Lind to be one of the first successes of the Defense Reform
Caucus.
Fall 1982—Steven L. Canby publishes "Military Reform and the
Art of War" in International Security Review .*









Toward a More Effective Defense is published
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) . This is the final report of the CSIS Defense
Organization Project. Members of the report steering
committee include the reformers Gansler, General Meyer and
Woolsey. Additionally the original Congressional Reform
Caucus members Nunn, Gingrich and Cohen are also part of
the committee.*
16 October 1985—Staff report to the Senate Armed Services
Committee entitled, Defense Organization: The Need for
Change , is published. The report includes input from
Luttwak. (S. PRT. 99-86)*
January 1986
—
The Maritime Strategy published by the U.S.
Naval Institute. This strategy responds to criticisms of
the Navy made by Lind, Polmar and Jayne in 1978.
28 February 1986--The Interim Report of the Packard Commission
is published. The report contains recommendations for
changes in defense structure some of which were later
incorporated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.*
14 February, 12 March 1986—House Armed Services Committee,
Investigations Subcommittee hearings held on
"Reorganization of the Department of Defense." Principle
witnesses include the reformers, Luttwak, General Meyer,
Packard, and Woolsey. (H.A.S.C. No. 99-53)
May 1986—Goldwater-Nichols Bill passed by Congress.
Previous hearings testimony from a number of reformers and
input from the Packard commission is a factor in passage.
30 June 1986 A Question for Excellence , the final report to
the President of the Packard Commission is published.*
12 January, 3 April 1987—Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings held on "National Security Strategy." Principle
witnesses include Dr Record, Colonel Summers and General
Meyer. (S. HRG. 100-257)
28 April, 4 November 1987—House Armed Services Committee,
Investigations Subcommittee hearings held on DOD
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Reorganization Implementation. Principle witnesses include
Fitzgerald who has been identified by Lind as an earlier
advocate of procurement reform. (H.A.S.C. No 100-34)
November 1988
—
Making Defense Reform Work is jointly published
by the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) and the CSIS. This
document is a report of the Joint Project on Defense
Reorganization, and the CSIS receives input from Luttwak.
6 March 1989—FMFM 1 published as Marine Corps doctrine by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. This doctrine embraces
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